



24 Oct 68

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From: GACarver, Jr.

Subject:

The attached letter was sent to me by Mr. Albert H. (Tad) Cantril, an FSO on Bundy's staff whom I have gotten to know in the course of Vietnam business. Mr. Cantril thought  letter reporting his conversation with Mr. Kazakov might be of some interest to our Sovietologists. I am, therefore, passing this along to you for any value it might have.

STAT

George A. Carver, Jr.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

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cc:



Handwritten signature

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF NATIONAL BEHAVIOR, INC.
210 NASSAU STREET
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540
AREA CODE 609 - WALNUT 4-5657

September 9, 1968

Dear Tad:

It may be of some interest that I had a chat with a Mr. Vladimir M. Kazakov, who is Counselor to the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the UN. He was interested in the study of "national character" although this is considered a reactionary field in the Soviet Union. He would define this more as a kind of social psychology. He was particularly interested in studies of the American social psychology and particularly in those which are historically and factually based rather than impressionistic.

Mr. Kazakov expressed the view that a continued series of adjustments and agreements between the two great powers will continue to be necessary for a long time to come. He expressed concern at what he perceived as some tendencies toward conservatism and isolationism in American public attitudes and regret that "certain circles" were interested in overdoing the press reaction to the Czechoslovakian intervention because this would make it much more difficult for the American leadership -- even Nixon -- to make the necessary adjustments in the face of public pressure against this. He commented that the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to "maintain a mature stance" in the face of the Vietnam war despite some difficulty springing therefrom.

Mr. Kazakov also remarked that he considered that the Soviet government might have overreacted to the Czechoslovakian crisis, "like the Chicago police".

Quite specifically, Mr. Kazakov felt that Ambassador Ball overdid his polemical attacks in the UN debate on the Czech crisis in a play for American public opinion and expressed concern that this would have a hardening effect which would hamper the United States government's freedom to come to discussions and agreements with his country. He found this puzzling in view of the Soviet understandings

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that some assurances had been given that the United States would not "interfere" in that matter. At this point he quoted some acquaintance having said that the Cuban crisis may have been the last Great Power confrontation, that the Vietnam involvement might be the last indirect confrontation in a small country, and that the Czechoslovak intervention could well be the last direct Great Power intervention in the affairs of an allied state. Possibly, he said, that was too optimistic.

Finally, with respect to Soviet developments he felt that "our people are becoming quite mature and that there has been considerable change from the ideological-deductive pattern of approach to policy issues to a more practically based approach.

I took the view that we were in for a period of coolness due to the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia and that this had lent a good deal of force to American public concern about Communist intentions in the world.

I have no idea what to make out of this. Kazakov is a poker face with very good control of his tongue. I don't think he was trying to open an unofficial channel of communication -- he kept stressing the personal nature of his interest in this field and reiterated that he had to do his studies on his own time. I invited him to visit me in Boston.

Sincerely yours,

[Redacted Signature]

Director

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Addendum: As a side issue, I pressed my particular concern about the pressure point in the Middle East which I regard as the most dangerous arena for a Great Power conflict because of the vital interests involved and the uncontrollability of local states. Mr. Kazakov, who elsewhere said that the United Nations was an unimportant instrument compared with direct relations, thought that the jarring mission might be helpful there depending upon the State of Israel almost entirely. I told him about having talked with Soviet Ambassador Sergei Venogradoff in Cairo some years before and finding him enthusiastic "in principle" about possibilities for Soviet-American cooperation in resolving the issues of that area. He only commented that Venegradoff -- for whom he had worked for a year or two in the policy planning area of the Soviet Foreign Ministry -- was not very flexible.